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One of the most important ideas about concepts—one that revolutionized the field—is that certain 
concepts can’t be fully characterized in terms of observable features.  Instead, at least for some categories, 
the category is represented in terms of an essence.  On this view—psychological essentialism—
essentialized categories are represented as having a true nature which is assumed to be shared among 
category members and responsible for similarities among members of a category.   
 
Psychological essentialism raises at least two questions.  The first concerns how essences are represented.  
The second concerns which categories are essentialized. 
 
The leading view, concerning the first question, is that essences are represented as scientific essences. 
This view is Lockean: an essence is the underlying property that causes observable features, and though 
we may not always know what that underlying property is, the presupposition is that the property is a 
scientific essence, e.g., H2O is the scientific essence of water (Gelman, 2003, Keil, 1989, Medin and 
Ortony, 1989).   
 
The dominant view concerning the categories that are essentialized—what we call natural/social kind 
essentialism—is that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social 
kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized (Gelman, 2003).  Artifactual kinds are not essentialized on this 
view (Gelman, 2003; see also Atran, 1998; Keil, 1989, 1994). As Gelman (2013) notes, “artifacts clearly 
do not possess essences based on DNA or birth parents” (p. 450).  More explicitly: “essentialism…is 
found in people’s categories of natural kinds (both living and non-living) and many social kinds 
(including races, ethnicities and traits), but not artifact categories” (Gelman, 2003, p. 12).  
 
We offer a very different answer to the two questions raised by psychological essentialism.  First, we 
suggest that essences are represented as purposes or tele.  This view—teleological essentialism—is 
Aristotelian (Rose and Nichols, 2019).  Second, natural kinds, both living and non-living natural kinds, as 
well as artifactual kinds, are essentialized in terms of tele. In other words, our view is that teleological 
essentialism is general, applying to a broad range of categories.  
 
Recent work indicates that people think the telos of a bee is to make honey and pollinate flowers while 
the telos of a spider is to make webs and catch insects.  If a bee is operated on to look like a spider, people 
categorize the thing as a bee when it has the bee telos and a spider when it has the spider telos.  
Preservation or change in telos also trumps inferences about innate potential and people even think the 
telos can be transmitted to offspring (Rose and Nichols, 2019).  This suggests that we do indeed associate 
essence with a kind of telos.  But this work only concerns living natural kinds.   
 
Previous work shows that teleological thinking applies broadly.  A wide range of research suggests that 
we naturally default to accepting teleological explanations for both living and non-living natural things 
(e.g., Bloom, 1997; Kelemen, 1999; Kelemen and Rosset, 2009; Piaget, 2017).  This tendency toward 
promiscuous teleological thinking emerges early and is never fully outgrown or replaced (e.g., Casler and 
Kelemen, 2008; Kelemen, Rottman and Seston, 2013).  Other work indicates that teleological thinking 
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applies broadly when making judgments about whether some parts compose a whole object (Rose and 
Schaffer, 2017a).  Regardless of whether people consider artifacts, organisms or non-living natural things 
like rocks, they tend to think that composition occurs when the result has a purpose.  The same tendency 
is displayed in persistence judgments.  People tend to think that an object persists through part 
alternations provided it preserves its purpose.  This pattern is found across artifacts, living and non-living 
kinds as well as social kinds, such as institutions and rock bands (see e.g., Rose, 2015; Rose, Schaffer and 
Tobia, 2019).  In light of these findings, if people do indeed operate with a teleological conception of 
essence, then we should expect that they should essentialize both artifacts and non-living natural kinds in 
terms of teleology.  Thus, our claim is that in addition to living natural kinds, artifacts and non-living 
natural kinds are essentialized in terms of a telos.  And our goal is to provide evidence that teleological 
essentialism is general.   
 
Natural/social kind essentialists maintain that artifacts aren’t essentialized.   By contrast, teleological 
essentialism makes a bold prediction: insofar as artifacts have tele they should be essentialized. 
 
One of the most important sources of evidence for essentialism involves judgments of stability.  If people 
think a thing can remain a category member despite radical transformation, such as complete inside 
replacement, provided it preserves its telos, then that suggests that essence is associated with a kind of 
telos. And if people think living and non-living natural kinds as well as artifactual kinds can retain 
category membership despite radical transformation, provided they preserve their telos, then that provides 
good evidence that teleological essentialism is indeed a general and genuine form of essentialism.  
 
Our goal is to provide evidence that essences for living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds and 
artifacts are associated with a kind of telos.  To accomplish this, we used the same kind of strategies that 
are typically used to provide evidence for essentialist thinking.  In our first study, we utilize cases where a 
thing undergoes a change in superficial features (see e.g., Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989).  We vary both (1) 
whether the thing preserves or changes its telos and (2) whether the thing is an artifact, living natural kind 
or non-living natural kind.  Despite the radical superficial change, preservation and change in telos affects 
category judgments in every case.  Our second study, inspired by work by Gelman and Wellman (1991), 
extends this to cases where a thing undergoes a different kind of radical transformation: complete inside 
replacement.  Here again we find that preservation or change in telos affects categorization judgments for 
artifacts, living and non-living natural kinds, despite radical transformation.  Study three involved an 
offspring study.  We told people about a special machine that works just like fertilization in animals—two 
things go into the machine and a new thing comes out; using such scenarios, we find that, across artifacts, 
living and non-living natural kinds, when the telos of the original thing changes, people are more inclined 
to think that the new thing that will come out of the machine will be a member of the category that has 
that telos.   Our fourth and final study tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism.  If 
preservation of telos plays an important role in retaining category membership, then one way telos can be 
preserved is by taking in the same kind of telos from a different thing. We show that, across artifacts and 
living and non-living natural kinds, if a thing takes in the same kind of telos from a different thing, then 
people are more inclined to view the thing as retaining category membership than when the thing changes 
its telos.  Moreover, we also show that people make inferences about preservation and change of telos on 
the basis of inside replacement and that judgements about the extent to which a thing preserves or 
changes its purpose play a role in generating category judgements. 
 
1. Study 1: Superficial Change 
 
Our first study addresses whether, across kinds, essence is associated with a kind of telos, despite the fact 
that the thing has undergone a radical change in superficial features.  And our strategy for addressing this 
is to simply manipulate whether a thing preserves or changes its telos and see whether that affects 
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categorization judgments.  Instead of simply stipulating the telos of a thing, we decided to run a pilot 
study and ask people what they think the purpose of a given kind is.  So we asked: 
 
1. What is the true purpose of vultures? 
2. What is the true purpose of hummingbirds? 
3. What is the true purpose of coal? 
4. What is the true purpose of magnetite? 
5. What is the true purpose of clocks? 
6. What is the true purpose of hot plates? 
 
We recruited forty participants for our pilot study.  Each participant received all six items in random order 
and were given an open-ended response.  We found that 78% of participants said the purpose of vultures 
is to eat dead animals; 63% of participants said the purpose of hummingbirds is to pollinate flowers; 73% 
said the purpose of coal is to produce energy; 65% thought the purpose of magnetite is attracting objects; 
90% said the purpose of clocks is to tell time; and lastly, 88% of participants said that the purpose of hot 
plates is to heat things up.  The results from our pilot study will thus serve as a guide for manipulating 
preservation and change in telos. 
 
Four-hundred participants (aged 18-70 years, mean age = 32 years; 217 females; 96% reporting English 
as a native language) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (Telos: Preserved, Changed) x 3 (Kind: Hot Plate, 
Vulture, Magnetite) design.  Below are the cases with variations marked by brackets: 
 
Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a 
special procedure on [a hot plate/a vulture/some magnetite].  [Hot Plate: They decide to remove 
its square base, paint the top white, add numbers and hour, minute and second hands./Vulture: 
They decide to stretch its beak, shorten its wings, legs and body and paint it with bright 
colors./Magnetite: They decide to make it rectangular shaped, smooth over its jagged surface and 
paint it dark black.] Here is an image of the [hot plate/vulture/magnetite] that they perform the 
special procedure on: 
 
         
 
After the special procedure, it looked like [a clock/a hummingbird/coal]: 
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[Telos Preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special procedure 
didn’t [tell time/pollinate flowers/produce energy].  Instead, it only [heated up/ate dead 
animals/attracted objects]. 
[Telos Changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special procedure 
didn’t [heat up/eat dead animals/attract objects].  Instead, it only [told time/pollinated 
flowers/produced energy]. 
After reading one of the six cases, participants responded to two comprehension questions: 
 
Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed a special procedure on [a hot plate/a 
vulture/some magnetite]. (Yes/No) 
 
Comprehension Check: The thing after the special procedure only [heats up/eats dead 
animals/attracts objects]. (Yes/No) 
 
They were then asked the key test question: 
 
Category: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation is [a hot plate or 
clock/a vulture or hummingbird/magnetite or coal] (1=it is definitely [a hotplate/a 
vulture/magnetite], 7=it is definitely [a clock/a hummingbird/coal]) 
 
We also included a question about whether the thing retained the true purpose of hot plates, vultures or 
coal, which served as a manipulation check: 
 
Purpose: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation retains the true 
purpose of [hot plates/vultures/magnetite]? (1=it definitely does not retain the true purpose of [hot 
plates/vultures/magnetite], 7=it definitely retains the true purpose of [hot 
plates/vultures/magnetite]) 
 
Twenty-eight participants failed one or more of the comprehension checks and were excluded from 
analysis.  Data was analyzed for the remaining 372 participants.   
 
First, our manipulation was highly successful.  A 2 x 3 ANOVA indicated that there was no effect of 
Kind on purpose judgments F(2, 366)=.875, p=.418, ηp2=.005 but there was main effect of Telos on 
purpose judgments, F(1, 366)=418.44, p<.001, ηp2=.533.  There was also an interaction between Kind 
and Telos on purpose judgments, F(2, 366)=10.10, p<.001, ηp2=.052.  Descriptive statistics for purpose 
judgments are in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Purpose 
Kind Telos M(SD) 95% CI 
Hot Plate Preserved 5.58(1.89) [5.12, 6.03] 
 Changed 1.53(1.43) [1.16, 1.89] 
Vulture Preserved 5.77(1.55) [5.39, 6.15] 
 Changed 1.75(1.20) [1.44, 2.06] 
Magnetite Preserved 5.02(1.95) [4.53, 5.51] 
 Changed 2.62(1.67) [2.19, 3.05] 
 
Importantly, a 2 x 3 ANOVA indicated that there was no effect of Kind on categorization judgments F(2, 
366)=2.36, p=.096, ηp2=.013 but there was a main effect of Telos on categorization judgments, F(1, 
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366)=309.41, p<.001, ηp2=.458.  There was also an interaction between Kind and Telos on categorization 
judgments, F(2, 366)=15.97, p<.001, ηp2=.080.  The results are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effect of Telos (Preserved, Changed) Across Kinds (Hot Plate, Vulture, Magnetite) with 
95% Confidence Intervals 
 
The important finding here is that across kinds—artifacts, living and non-living natural kinds—
preservation and change in telos had an effect on categorization judgments.  This pattern occurred across 
each kind, despite the fact that the thing underwent radical superficial changes, which included changes in 
size, shape and color.   The fact that preservation and change in telos had an effect across kinds, even 
when a thing undergoes superficial transformation, suggests that teleological essentialism might be 
general.   
 
We noted above that one of the most important sources of evidence for  essentialist thinking emerges 
when participants judge that a thing retains category membership despite radical transformation.  But the 
kinds of changes that things underwent in our first study—changes in size, shape and color—might not be 
all that radical.  A more radical change would be if a thing underwent complete inside replacement.   We 
investigate this in our next study. 
 
2. Study 2: Inside Replacement 
 
Four-hundred participants (aged 18-72 years, mean age = 35 years; 227 females; 97% reporting English 
as a native language) were again recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (Telos: Preserved, Changed) x 3 
(Kind: Clock, Hummingbird, Coal) design.  Below are the cases with variations marked by brackets: 
 
Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a 
special procedure on [a clock/a hummingbird/some coal].  They decide to remove the insides of 
the [clock/hummingbird/coal] and replace them with the insides from [a hot plate/a vulture/some 
magnetite].  Here is an image of the [clock/hummingbird/coal] that they perform the special 
procedure on: 
 
 
1
2
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7
Hot Plate Vulture Magnetite
Effect of Telos Across Kinds on Catgeorization
Preserved Changed
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After the special procedure, the insides were changed but it still looked like this: 
 
 
        
 
[Telos Preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special procedure 
didn’t [heat up/eat dead animals/attract objects].  Instead, it only [told time/pollinated 
flowers/produced energy]. 
[Telos Changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special procedure 
didn’t [tell time/pollinate flowers/produce energy].  Instead, it only [heated up/ate dead 
animals/attracted objects]. 
After reading one of the six cases, participants responded to two comprehension questions: 
 
Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed a special procedure on [a clock/a 
hummingbird/some coal]. (Yes/No) 
 
Comprehension Check: The thing after the special procedure only [heats up/eats dead 
animals/attracts objects]. (Yes/No) 
 
They were then asked to make a categorization judgment: 
 
Category: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation is [a clock or 
hotplate/a hummingbird or vulture/coal or magnetite] (1=it is definitely [a clock/a 
hummingbird/coal], 7=it is definitely [a hotplate/a vulture/magnetite]) 
 
Lastly, we again included a manipulation check: 
 
Purpose: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation retains the true 
purpose of [clocks/hummingbirds/coal]? (1=it definitely does not retain the true purpose of 
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[clocks/hummingbirds/coal], 7=it definitely retains the true purpose of 
[clocks/hummingbirds/coal]) 
 
Forty-one participants failed one or more of the comprehension checks and were excluded from analysis.  
Data was analyzed for the remaining 359 participants.   
 
As in our first study, our manipulation was highly successful.  A 2 x 3 ANOVA indicated that there was a 
main effect of Kind on purpose judgments F(2, 353)=5.12, p<.01, ηp2=.028 and a main effect of Telos on 
purpose judgments, F(1, 353)=294.13, p<.001, ηp2=.455.  There was also an interaction between Kind 
and Telos on purpose judgments, F(2, 353)=14.89, p<.001, ηp2=.078.  Descriptive statistics for purpose 
judgments are in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Purpose 
Kind Telos M(SD) 95% CI 
Clock Preserved 5.39(1.84) [4.90, 5.88] 
 Changed 1.35(.78) [1.16, 1.54] 
Hummingbird Preserved 5.33(1.52) [4.95, 5.71] 
 Changed 1.87(1.38) [1.51, 2.23] 
Coal Preserved 3.97(1.88) [3.40, 4.34] 
 Changed 2.24(1.38) [1.90, 2.58] 
 
But the important question is whether preservation or change in telos affects categorization judgments. A 
2 x 3 ANOVA indicated that there was a main effect of Kind on categorization judgments F(2, 353)=5.12, 
p<.01, ηp2=.028 and a main effect of Telos on categorization judgments, F(1, 353)=294.13, p<.001, 
ηp2=.455.  There was also an interaction between Kind and Telos on categorization judgments, F(2, 
353)=14.89, p<.001, ηp2=.078.  The results are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of Telos (Preserved, Changed) Across Kinds (Clock, Hummingbird, Coal) with 
95% Confidence Intervals 
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The crucial finding is this: across kinds, preservation and change in telos has a similar effect.  When a 
thing preserves its telos, people are significantly more inclined to think the thing retains original category 
membership; when it changes its telos, people are more inclined to view the thing as changing categories.  
And this pattern obtains across kinds despite radical transformation (i.e., inside replacement).  This 
suggests that teleological essentialism is general, applying to artifacts, living natural kinds and non-living 
natural kinds.  And it also suggests that tele are viewed as preserved, as stable, across radical 
transformation, such as complete inside replacement.   
 
So far we have used the same kind of experimental procedures—superficial change, inside replacement—
typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking.  But a very different, and important, test of 
essentialist thinking involves testing whether essence is transmitted to offspring.  Rose and Nichols 
(2019), for instance, found that when a bee had its telos changed to conform to that of a spider, regardless 
of whether the eggs of the post-transformation thing were fertilized by a bee or spider, participants were 
more likely to say the offspring would be spiders. This finding suggest that teleological essences can be 
transmitted to offspring.  But how might we test this for artifacts and non-living natural things? 
 
Our strategy was to follow the same procedure used in Rose and Nichols (2019, study 4).  But instead of 
telling participants that the post-transformation thing had its eggs fertilized we decided to tell people that 
the scientists devised a special machine that works just like fertilization in animals.  Two things go in and 
a new thing comes out.  This enabled us to examine whether people think teleological essences can be 
transmitted to “offspring” across kinds.   
 
3. Study 3: “Offspring” 
 
Eight-hundred participants (aged 18-73 years, mean age = 35 years; 429 females; 96% reporting English 
as a native language) were again recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions in a 2 (Telos: Preserved, Changed) x 3 
(Kind: Hot Plate, Vulture, Magnetite) x 2 (Fertilized: Same Thing, Different Thing) design.  The 
materials were the same as in study 1.  People were asked the same two comprehension questions and 
then made a categorization judgment.  Since the same manipulation of preservation and change of telos 
used in study 1 was used here, we omitted the purpose manipulation check.  So after making the 
categorization judgments, participants read the following, which varied in whether the thing was fertilized 
by the same or different kind of thing: 
 
Suzy and Andy have devised a special machine that works just like fertilization in animals.  Two 
things go into the special machine and a new thing comes out.  They place the thing they 
performed the special procedure on and a [hotplate/clock or vulture/hummingbird or 
magnetite/coal] inside the machine.  
They were then asked: 
Offspring: To what extent do you think that the new thing that will come out of the machine will 
be [a hotplate or clock/a vulture or hummingbird/magnetite or coal]? (1: it will definitely be [a 
hotplate/a vulture/magnetite], 7: it will definitely be [a clock/a hummingbird/coal]) 
 
Fifty participants failed one or more of the comprehension checks and were excluded from analysis.  Data 
was analyzed for the remaining 750 participants.   
 
First, for categorization judgments, we replicated our results from study 1 (see Figure 3).  A 2 x 3 
ANOVA indicated that there was an effect of Kind on categorization judgments F(2, 744)=6.132, p<.01, 
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ηp2=.016 and there was main effect of Telos on categorization judgments, F(1, 744)=672.78, p<.001, 
ηp2=.475.  There was also an interaction between Kind and Telos on categorization judgments, F(2, 
366)=41.03, p<.001, ηp2=.099. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Telos (Preserved, Changed) Across Kinds (Hot Plate, Vulture, Magnetite) with 
95% Confidence Intervals 
 
More importantly, a 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA indicated that there was no effect of Kind on offspring judgments 
F(2, 738)=1.22, p=.294, ηp2=.003 and no effect of Fertilized on offspring judgments, F(1, 738)=3.14, 
p=.077, ηp2=.004.  But there was a main effect of Telos on offspring judgments, F(1, 738)=124.31, 
p<.001, ηp2=.144.  There was also an interaction between Kind and Telos on offspring judgments, F(2, 
738)=5.34, p<.01, ηp2=.014 and an interaction between Fertilized and Telos, F(1, 738)=100.81, p<.001, 
ηp2=.120.  The interaction between Fertilized and Kind was not significant, F(2, 738)=1.01, p=.364, 
ηp2=.003. And the three-way interaction was not significant, F(2, 738)=.03, p=.972, ηp2=.000.  The 
results are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Effect of Telos (Preserved, Changed) Across Kinds (Hot Plate, Vulture, Magnetite) and 
Fertilized (Hot Plate or Clock, Vulture or Hummingbird, Magnetite or Coal) with 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
 
Here is the crucial finding: categorization judgments for offspring are driven by telos.  For instance, when 
the mutant combined with a hotplate has the telos of a hotplate, people are more inclined to say it will be 
a hotplate than if it has the telos of a clock; when the mutant combined with a clock has the telos of a 
clock, people are more inclined to say it will be a clock than if it has the telos of a hotplate.  And similarly 
for the other mutants.   
 
Our findings indicate that telos plays a crucial role in the kind of categorization we see in essentialist 
research: studies 1 and 2 show that people rely on the telos to make judgments about persistence through 
both outer and inner transformations; study 3 shows that people think a telos can be transmitted to 
“offspring”.  The fact that we find that people rely on telos to make categorization judgments for artifacts, 
living and non-living natural kinds when using the same procedures used to provide evidence of 
essentialist thinking suggest that teleological essentialism is a general and genuine form of essentialism. 
 
In our fourth and final study, we wanted to test a unique prediction of teleological essentialism: if 
preservation of telos plays a role in retaining category membership, despite radical transformation, then 
one way a thing can preserve its telos is by taking in the same kind of telos from a different thing.  Thus, 
if a thing takes in a similar telos from a different kind of thing, people should be more inclined to think 
the original thing retains membership in the original category than when the thing takes in a different kind 
of telos.  In addition to testing this prediction of teleological essentialism, we also wanted to test both 
whether people will infer, without being told, that a thing either preserves or changes its telos and whether 
inferences about preservation and change in telos generate category judgments.   
 
4. Study 4: A Different Way to Preserve Telos 
 
One question we wanted to address in our final study was whether people would infer that a thing 
preserves or changes its telos without being explicitly told so.  Our strategy in addressing this was to 
utilize the same cases as in our second study, where a thing undergoes complete inside replacement, but 
not explicitly vary whether the thing preserves or changes its telos.   The guiding idea was that if a thing 
has its insides replaced with the insides of a thing that has the same kind of telos, then people would be 
more inclined to view the original thing as preserving its purpose than when its insides were replaced with 
insides from a thing that has a different telos.   
 
What we need, then, are things that people tend to think have similar and different purposes.  Then we can 
replace the insides of a target thing with insides of things that have the same or different tele and see if 
that affects purpose judgments.  So we ran another pilot study, again with 40 people, and asked them: 
 
 1. What is the true purpose of watches? 
 2. What is the true purpose of sparrows? 
 3. What is the true purpose of finches? 
 4. What is the true purpose of granite? 
 5. What is the true purpose of limestone? 
 
As in our first pilot, each participant provided an open-ended response to each question which was 
presented in random order.  The results from our pilot study indicated that 88% of people said that the 
purpose of watches is to tell time; 48% said the purpose of sparrows is to spread seeds, eat insects or both; 
45% said the same thing about finches; 63% said the purpose of granite is to build or support things; and 
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lastly, 55% of people said the same thing about limestone as they did granite.  The items here, along with 
clocks, hot plates, vultures and coal, from our first pilot study, will be utilized in varying preservation and 
change in telos via inside replacement. 
 
Four-hundred and fifty participants (aged 18-70 years, mean age = 33 years; 242 females; 98% reporting 
English as a native language) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (Insides: Same Telos, Different Telos) 
x 3 (Kind: Clock, Sparrow, Granite) design.  Below are the cases with variations marked by brackets: 
 
Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a 
special procedure on [a clock/a sparrow/some granite].  They decide to remove the insides of the 
[clock/sparrow/granite] and replace them with the insides from [a watch/a hot plate/a finch/a 
vulture/some limestone/some coal].  Here is an image of the [clock/sparrow/granite] that they 
perform the special procedure on: 
 
             
 
 
 
After the special procedure, the insides were changed but it still looked like this: 
 
             
 
 
Participants were asked two comprehension questions after reading one of the six cases: 
 
Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed a special procedure on [a clock/a 
sparrow/some granite]. (Yes/No) 
 
Comprehension Check: The [clock/sparrow/granite] had its insides replaced. (Yes/No) 
 
They were then given the following two questions presented in random order: 
 
Category: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special procedure is [a clock or hot 
plate/watch/a sparrow or vulture/finch/granite or coal/limestone]? (1=it is definitely [a clock/a 
sparrow/granite], 7=it is definitely [a hot plate/a watch/a vulture/a finch/coal/limestone]) 
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Purpose: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special procedure retains the true 
purpose of [clocks/sparrows/granite]? (1=it definitely does not retain the true purpose of 
[clocks/sparrows/granite] 7=it definitely retains the true purpose of [clocks/sparrows/granite]) 
 
Forty-eight people missed at least one comprehension check and so data was analyzed from the remaining 
402 participants.   
 
Between-subjects univariate tests indicated that there was an effect of Kind on Category, F(2, 
396)=22.631, p<.001, ηp2=.103 and Purpose F(2, 396)=15.995, p<.001, ηp2=.075 and an effect of Insides 
on Category F(1, 396)=28.860, p<.001, ηp2=.068 and Purpose, F(1, 396)=65.382, p<.001, ηp2=.142.  
There was no interaction for Category F(2, 396)=2.127, p=.121, ηp2=.011 but there was an interaction for 
Purpose, F(2, 396)=18.519, p<.001, ηp2=.086. The results are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of Insides (Same Telos, Different Telos) on Category and Purpose (Reverse Coded)  
Judgments Across Kinds with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
Lastly, to determine whether purpose judgments generate category judgements in a context where people 
make inferences about whether the thing has preserved or changed its telos, we tested for mediation.  We 
found that a regression model with Insides as a predictor of Category was significant, t(401)=5.06, β=-
.246, p<.001, a regression model with Insides as a predictor of Purpose was significant, t(401)=7.49, β=-
.351, p<.001, a regression model with Purpose as a predictor of Category was significant, t(401)=14.51, 
β=.587, p<.001, but that in a multiple regression model with both Insides and Purpose as predictors of 
Category, the effect of Insides on Category was no longer significant, t(401)=1.05, β=.045, p=.295.  We 
also tested an alternative mediation model with Category as a mediator of Insides on Purpose but the 
effect of Category was still significant in the multiple regression model, t(401)=5.44, β=.220, p<.001.1  
The mediation model is shown in Figure 6. 
 
1 For more on testing alternative models see e.g., Iacobucci et al., 2007; Rose & Nichols, 2013; Rose et al. 2011; 
Rose & Nichols 2013; Rose and Nichols, forthcoming; Rose 2017; and Turri et al. 2016. 
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Figure 6: Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between Insides and Category 
mediated by Purpose. 
These results indicate three things: First, when insides are replaced, people infer, without being told, that 
a thing either preserves or changes its telos.  Second, when the insides transfer a similar telos people are 
more inclined to think the original thing retains its original category membership and purpose than when 
the telos is different.  Lastly, purpose judgments generate category judgments in a context where people 
infer that the telos has been preserved or changed. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our focus was on generalizing and expanding teleological essentialism.  On our view, essences are 
represented by a kind of telos, not by scientific essences (Rose and Nichols, 2019).  Importantly, in 
contrast to natural/social kind essentialism, our view is that a broad range of categories, including 
artifactual categories, are essentialized in terms of a teleology.  And our findings support this.   
 
In our first study, we found that, despite radical superficial change, preservation and change in telos has a 
similar impact on categorization judgments for artifacts (e.g., a hot plate), living natural kinds (e.g., a 
vulture) and non-living natural kinds (e.g., magnetite).  Our second study took this one step further.  
Despite an even more radical change—complete inside replacement—preservation and change in telos 
had a similar impact on categorization judgements for artifacts (e.g., a clock), living natural kinds (e.g., a 
hummingbird) and non-living natural kinds (e.g., coal).  Study three provided evidence that teleological 
essences can be transmitted to “offspring”.  Regardless of whether people considered artifacts, living 
natural kinds or non-living natural kinds, and regardless of what “fertilized” the thing, when the telos of 
the original thing changed, they were more inclined to think the new thing that would emerge from the 
“fertilization” machine would be a member of the category with that telos. Our final study replicated the 
same basic pattern found in study two in a context where preservation and change in telos wasn’t 
explicitly manipulated.  There we found that people make inferences about whether the thing preserved or 
changed its purpose when its insides are replaced.  We also found that when the insides of the original 
thing were replaced with the insides from a thing that people thought had a similar telos, people were 
more inclined to think the original thing retained its purpose and retained category membership.  And we 
provided evidence that inferences about the purpose of a thing play a role in generating category 
judgments.   
 
Together, this suggests that teleological essentialism is general, that essence is represented by a kind of 
telos for a broad range of categories. Teleological essentialism puts pressure on natural/social kind 
essentialism and also provides a general and unified view of essentialism across a range of kinds.  That 
said, we want to conclude by considering a different view of essentialism, one that may have a similar 
kind of generality to teleological essentialism.  
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Inspired by work on “dual-character” concepts (e.g., Knobe, Prasda and Newman, 2013; see also De Pinal 
and Reuter, 2017), it has been suggested that while  natural kinds have Lockean essences value-laden 
kinds (e.g., rock band, scientist) have Platonic essences. Both kinds of essences involve representing an 
abstract structure that is taken to explain how category members are related (Newman and Knobe, 
forthcoming).  This offers a general view of essentialism. And it is supported by work indicating that we 
represent value-laden kinds in terms of Platonic essences (e.g., DeFrietas et al., 2017; Newman et. al., 
2015; Strohminger et. al., 2017) and natural kinds in terms of Lockean essences (e.g., Tobia, Knobe and 
Newman, forthcoming).  Perhaps this view, what we will call Lockean/Platonic essentialism, fares just as 
well, or perhaps even better, than Aristotelian essentialism in offering a general view of essentialist 
thinking.  
 
One of the main reasons for favoring Aristotelian essentialism over Lockean/Platonic essentialism is that 
Lockean/Platonic essentialism is bifurcated while Aristotelian essentialism is unified.  So while the 
Lockean/Platonic view explains essentialist judgments regarding natural kinds in terms of Lockean 
essentialism and essentialist judgments regarding value-laden kinds in terms of Platonic essentialism, 
Aristotelian essentialism replaces Lockean essences for natural kinds with teleological essences.  And 
when it comes to value-laden kinds where Platonic essences seems to explain essentialist judgments, we 
think Aristotelian essentialism provides a good explanation of our essentialist inclinations.   
 
To take one example, consider scientist.  Knobe et al (2013) suggest that, in thinking about this, we might 
think of the following features: developing theories, running experiments, considering opposing views 
and conducting statistical analyses.  The question then is whether there is some deeper thing that all of 
these features serve to realize. The Platonic answer is that the what unified these various features is some 
deeper value.  But, for Aristotle, the ideal is to realize one’s telos.  It is thus natural to think that the 
deeper ideal here is teleological.   
 
There is some suggestive evidence supporting the idea that teleology is the ideal.  Casler, Terziyan and 
Greene (2009) taught children the function of both familiar and unfamiliar artifacts.  What they found was 
that when a puppet used the objects in ways that were inconsistent with the thing's function, children 
responded by either protesting or tattling on the puppet.  The fact that these reactions occurred for both 
familiar and unfamiliar artifacts suggests that children rapidly map function information onto artifacts and 
form normative expectations about the thing’s proper use.  In other work, Casler et al., 2010, find that the 
tendency of children to make scale errors for artifacts, such as trying to enter a miniature, toy car, is 
explained by their deep-seated focus on purpose.  Indeed, even brief exposure to the function of a novel 
artifact leads children to focus on it to the point of attempting to use it under impossible circumstances 
(e.g., when it is way too small or large).  In fact, children even favor function over appropriately scaled 
objects for the task at hand.  Moreover, Casler, Hoffman and Eshelman (2014) find the same basic pattern 
in adults.  For adults, just like children, function sometimes trumps size.   
 
Together, what these findings suggest is that we are deeply sensitive to information about function. It is 
natural to think that this tendency has an Aristotelian, as opposed to Platonic, explanation.  The ideal is 
realization of the telos.  To focus on the telos, then, is to focus on the ideal.  And in doing so, we end up 
forming normative expectations.   
 
Aristotelian essentialism puts pressure on Lockean/Platonic essentialism though it leaves open whether 
Aristotelian essentialism might integrate with some combination of Lockean or Platonic essentialism.  We 
add that while Aristotelian essentialism looks to be better positioned to provide a general theory of 
essentialist thinking it also puts pressure on views that deny that we do essentialize categories.  One 
prominent view that denies that we essentialize categories is “causal minimalism” (Strevens, 2019).  On 
this view, what appear to be essentialists beliefs are actually beliefs of the form "There is something about 
category C that causes X, Y and Z".  And this clearly falls short of essentializing a category.  But our 
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findings indicate that there is more to categorizing than causal minimalism suggests. Tele provide a 
substantive account of what is distinctive about the representation of essentialized categories.2  
 
We conclude by flagging some limitations and further questions. First, our pilot studies were aimed at 
uncovering what people think the purpose of a thing is.  But our pilot questions e.g., “What is the true 
purpose of a hotplate?” presuppose that people do think the thing has a purpose, and, future studies might 
first ask participants whether they think the thing has a purpose before asking what that purpose is.  Even 
so, we note that people had no trouble answering this and crucially, varying the features people identified 
with the thing’s telos affected categorization judgments and purpose judgments in our experiments which 
involved different participants.   
 
Second, demand characteristics might have had some effect on our findings.  For instance, participants 
were asked two comprehension questions where one of these was related to the thing’s purpose (e.g., 
“The thing after the special procedure only [heats up/eats dead animals/attracts objects].”).  That might 
have primed some people to rely on this information when responding to test questions.  But we note that 
this comprehension questions did not explicitly mention purpose. More generally, similar effects of 
teleological thinking are found even when no such comprehension questions are asked (e.g. Rose, 2015).  
 
Third, it would be useful to see whether participants think these kinds of transformations are possible, and 
whether such judgments have effects on categorization.  For instance, perhaps people do not think it is 
possible that vulture insides can be stuffed into a hummingbird.  And perhaps that affects their 
categorization judgments.  If so, future research could investigate whether participants think the candidate 
transformations are possible and whether that affects the kind of categorization judgments they make. 
Participant explanations, which tend to be underutilized, might provide useful data in this regard and also 
give insight into the kind of information participants import into the task (see e.g., Rose, Buckwalter and 
Nichols, 2017 on importing).  
 
Fourth, our experimental design departs in some ways from that of Keil (1989).  Keil gives people cases 
where a thing undergoes transformation and then asks what the thing is. Since essence is immutable, 
people should be inclined to think that the transformation did not change what the thing was.  And this is 
what Keil finds.  Our experimental design is similar in that it features cases where a thing undergoes 
transformation but its telos is preserved.  But our experimental design has the addition that we include 
cases where a thing changes its telos.  And that’s to determine whether change in telos leads to changes to 
in people’s categorization judgments.  An additional way to test for teleological essentialism, and one that 
is closely related to study 4, would be to give people cases where a thing undergoes superficial 
transformation (e.g., a vulture made to look like a hummingbird) and then ask whether it would change 
category membership and whether its teleological features would change. Although we didn’t run such 
cases, we do expect that people’s category judgments would track their teleological judgments once 
again.  
 
Fifth, we have been focused on providing support for teleological essentialism and in doing so put 
pressure on natural/social kind essentialism.  Natural/social kind essentialism denies that artifacts are 
essentialized, so the fact that we do essentialize artifacts, and do so in terms of teleology, suffices to 
threaten natural/social kind essentialism.  Still one might wonder whether we do essentialize natural kinds 
in terms of scientific essences.  A useful test would be to pit preservation or change of, e.g., genes, against 
preservation or change in telos to see if either of these alone or in combination affect categorization 
judgments.  Moreover, further research should focus on whether it is simply behavior and not teleology 
that plays a role in categorization (e.g., Hampton et. al., 2007). Though our fertilization machine study 
suggests that it is not simply behavior but rather teleology that plays a role in categorization, contrasting 
 
2 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
16 
 
teleological features with scientific features or even other characteristic features of things will be useful in 
further examining teleological essentialism.   
 
Lastly, there are further, independent questions related to artifacts.  Our findings cohere with those of 
Rips (1989) who finds that people categorize a thing that looks like an umbrella as a lampshade when it is 
described as having the intended function of a lampshade.  And they also cohere with findings by Rose 
and Schaffer (2017b) who find that both intended function and success play a role in composition 
judgments about artifacts.  Malt and Johnson (1992), however, provide results which appear to put 
pressure on the idea that function plays a central role in categorization judgments for artifacts.  What they 
find is that physical features impact categorization judgments for artifacts.  For instance, people think the 
function of a sweater is to provide warmth yet are more inclined to think something is a sweater if it is 
made of wool as opposed to rubber, even when both are described as providing warmth.  This appears to 
conflict with what we have found here concerning artifacts.  But it could be that information about 
material interacted with people’s view of whether the thing successfully fulfilled its function. Participants 
might have been less inclined to think that rubber, as opposed to wool, provides warmth.  This is 
plausible, especially in light of Rose and Schaffer’s (2017) findings indicating that successfully fulfilling 
a function matters in composition judgments about artifacts.  Since Malt and Johnson (1992) didn’t ask 
participants whether the thing successfully fulfilled its intended function, this remains a possibility.  But 
another option is that categorization involves a constellation of features that receive different weightings 
(e.g., Hampton et al. 2007). So categorization might include more than just information about category 
essence.  If so, it is a further question how teleology and other features work together to render 
categorization judgments, especially concerning artifacts. 
 
We acknowledge that further work should be done on the issues raised by this work. But at this point we 
think we have provided evidence that we do essentialize a broad range of categories in terms of teleology.  
How broadly this goes (e.g., do we essentialize gender and race in terms of teleology?) remains to be 
seen.  The current work however indicates that a surprising range of kinds are essentialized in terms of 
teleology and thus provides reason to suspect that yet other categories will be found to be essentialized in 
terms of teleology.3  
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